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Abstract
Motivated by the European sovereign debt crisis, we study the sovereign risk by analyzing
the solvency and the sovereign bond yield and propose a hybrid model which takes into
account the movement of the sovereign solvency and the impact of critical political events.
This model combines the structural and the reduced-form approaches in the credit risk
modelling and the sovereign default time can be decomposed into an accessible part with
predictable components and a totally inaccessible part. As a consequence, the probability
of default at a critical political event date is nonzero and the probability law admits atoms.
We study this model in a generalized density framework to deduce the compensator process
of default and show that the intensity process does not necessarily exist. We also apply the
model to the valuation of sovereign bond and explain the significant jumps in the long-term
government bond yield during the sovereign crisis.
Keywords : sovereign risk, sovereign solvency, decomposition of stopping times, generalized
density of default, long-term government bond.
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1 Introduction
The European sovereign debt crisis started at the end of 2009, when the long-term interest
rates of euro area countries began to diverge significantly. This has made it difficult for several
member states in the euro area (e.g., Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus) to refinance their public
debts without aid of third parties. The crisis has also led to a growing amount of attention to
sovereign risks from governments and financial markets.
Sovereign risk is the possibility that the government of a country may default on its debt or
other obligations. It belongs to the family of credit risks, and is a fundamental component of
risks in government bond yield curves. The modelling of sovereign risks is a challenging subject
and can differ from the corporate credit risk. Firstly, sovereign default is usually influenced
by macroeconomic factors such as GDP, public debt, government revenue and expenditure,
etc. Secondly, political events and decisions have important impacts on the sovereign default,
especially for a European Union country.
In literature (see e.g., Alogoskoufis [2]), the determinant macroeconomic variables can be
summarized by a single one known as the sovereign solvency, which can be measured and
monitored easily. Concerning the political decisions, we are notably interested in the impact
when a critical political event happens. In practice, we observe that on a critical date when
important political events hold, the sovereign default probability can become significant. This
point may be justified by the following intuitive argument: when a sovereign is unable to repay
its public debt, it solicits an international financial aid as a last resort; if the sovereign is not
able to receive the financial support, it can end up in default. We have chosen as example three
critical dates, noted as T1, T2 and T3, all of which concern the financial aid packages for Greece:
• on 2 May 2010 (T1), the euro area member states and International Monetary Fund (IMF)
agree on a 110-billion-euro financial aid package for Greece;
• on 21 July 2011 (T2), the government heads of the euro area agree to support a new
financial aid program of 109-billion-euro for Greece;
• on 8 March 2012 (T3), the European Central Bank (ECB) governing council acknowledges
the activation of the buy-back scheme for Greece and decides that debt instruments issued
or fully guaranteed by Greece will be again accepted as collateral in European credit
operations.
We notice that T1, T2 and T3 are predetermined dates publicly known to investors since
political events are in general arranged in advance and these dates can be found on the official
website of ECB. The impact of these political events can be observed in the long-term Greek
government bond yield. As illustrated in Figure 1 (extracted from Figure 2), the bond yield
has significant movements around T1, T2 and T3 with very high levels of the yield before and
negative jumps at or slightly after these dates.
Macroeconomic models of debt crisis emphasize such phenomena by the multiple equilibria in
debt markets in presence of credit risk. The prevailing equilibrium depends on the expectations
of investors about the probability of default (e.g., Calvo [7]). Before a critical political event,
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Figure 1: Greek bond yield around political critical dates (source: Bloomberg)
investors expect a sovereign default with a high probability, in which case the spread of the
government bond is very large, and the debt market is in a large-spread equilibrium. Shortly
after the critical political event, the expectation of investors about the sovereign default is
suddenly discharged to keep a narrow-spread equilibrium. Therefore, one can say that the
probability of default at the time of a critical political event is nonzero, characterized by a jump
in long-term government bond yield.
Figure 2: Historical 10-year Greek bond yield (source: Bloomberg)
From mathematical point of view, the nonzero probability of default on a predetermined
date means that the default time has a predictable component. In the literature on credit risk
modelling, two approaches exist: structural approach and reduced-form approach. In a standard
structural model, the default time is often a predictable stopping time defined as the first hitting
time of a certain default barrier by the asset value process of a firm; while in a reduced-form
model, it is usually a totally inaccessible stopping time modeled as the first jump time of a point
process with stochastic intensity. Both approaches have been widely used to model corporate
credit risks (see the books of Bielecki and Rutkowski [5] and Duffie and Singleton [16] for a
detailed description).
In this paper, we propose a hybrid model which is based on both approaches of the classic
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credit risk models and takes into account the level of the sovereign solvency and the impact
of critical political events. We intend to explain the significant movements of the sovereign
bond yield during the sovereign debt crisis by the mixed characteristic of the hybrid model. We
are inspired by the jump to default CEV (constant elasticity of variance) models in Carr and
Linetsky [9] and Campi, Polbennikov and Sbuelz [8], which have been originally proposed for
assessing corporate credit risks. In [9], the equity value is a CEV diffusion punctuated by a
possible jump to zero which corresponds to default. The default time τ is decomposed into a
predictable part, which is the first hitting time of zero by the equity value process, and a totally
inaccessible part given by a Cox process model. In [8], the equity value is a CEV process, and
the default time is the minimum of the first Poisson jump and the first absorption time of the
equity value process by zero in absence of jumps. So the default time can be either predictable
according to the CEV process, or totally inaccessible according to a Poisson jump. In the credit
risk literature, there exist other hybrid models such as the generalized Cox process model in
Be´langer, Shreve and Wong [4] and the credit migration hybrid model in Chen and Filipovic´ [10].
Recently, Gehmlich and Schmidt [20] consider models where the Aze´ma supermartingale of τ
contains jumps (so that the intensity does not exist) and develop the associated term structures.
The decomposition of random times also appears in literature on the theory of enlargement of
filtrations such as Aksamit, Choulli and Jeanblanc [1] and Coculescu [12].
The hybrid model of sovereign default that we propose in this paper also combines the
structural and the reduced-form approaches. The sovereign default time contains an accessible
part which describes the macroeconomic and political factors, and a totally inaccessible part as
in the Cox process model which describes the idiosyncratic credit risk. we can also recover the
jump to default CEV model. We also study this sovereign default model in a general setting
which extends the default density approach introduced in El Karoui, Jeanblanc and Jiao [17] and
we make the so-called generalized density hypothesis to describe random times whose conditional
distribution can admit atoms.
The hybrid model of sovereign default can be applied to the valuation of sovereign defaultable
claims. The pricing formula showes that the sovereign bond yield deduced in the model can have
jumps at the political critical dates. Furthermore, numerical tests illustrate that the political
critical dates and decisions have an important impact on the probability of sovereign default as
shown in Figure 2.
The following of the paper is organized as below. In Section 2, we propose the sovereign
default model by making precise the different components of risks including the sovereign sol-
vency, the political decision impact and the idiosyncratic credit risk. Section 3 concentrates on
the conditional default and survival probabilities, and in particular the probability of default on
the political critical dates. In Section 4, we study the sovereign default model in a generalized
density framework. We discuss theoretical properties of the random time such as the immersion
property and the compensator process, and show that in this model, the intensity does not
exist in general. In Section 5, we apply the sovereign default model to the pricing of long-term
sovereign zero-coupon bonds and we explain the jumps in the bond yield with numerical results.
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2 Hybrid model of sovereign default time
In this section, we present a hybrid model for the sovereign default which takes into account the
macroeconomic situations of the country, the impact of political events and the idiosyncratic
default intensity.
2.1 Sovereign solvency: a structural model
We start by introducing the notion of solvency. Sovereign default is tightly related to the
macroeconomic factors of the country. Notably, the sovereign solvency is an important indicator
since it includes several determinant macroeconomic variables related to the sovereign default.
Here, we borrow the definition used in [2].
Definition 2.1 The sovereign solvency S at time t is defined by
lnSt = pit − dt−(rt − gt)
1 + gt
, (2.1)
where dt− denotes the public debt to GDP ratio of the previous observation date, pit is the primary
surplus to GDP ratio, rt is the real interest rate on government bonds, and gt is the GDP growth
rate. In particular, we say that the government is fiscally sustainable if St ≥ 1, and is insolvent
if St < 1.
Slightly different from the initial definition, we use the exponential form such that the solvency
takes only positive values. By definition, four factors determine whether a government is solvent.
The predetermined historical debt is known from the government’s balance sheet of the preceding
year. The real interest rate on government bonds, which is the cost of debt refinancing, can be
deduced from bond yield curves. The GDP growth rate is observable directly from the economic
cycle. The primary surplus, which is the measurement of government deficit, can be computed
from the government revenue and expenditure, as well as the fiscal dynamics. In practice, these
data are available for discrete time observation.
We illustrate in Figure 3 the solvency values computed by using (2.1) for the following four
member states of the euro area: Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal1. We notice that all
these countries are insolvent during the crisis (solvency lower than 1 from 2009), with Greece
and Ireland in the worst situation. This observation is rather coherent with the reality since
Greece and Ireland are the first countries that solicit aid from third parties. Furthermore, the
crisis starts at the end of 2009 when the solvency of several countries falls below 0.9, so we can
consider 0.9 as an approximate threshold of the debt crisis. Indeed, fears about a debt crisis
begin to spread when the solvency of a country hits down a certain threshold.
In a long-term time scale, we model the sovereign solvency by a continuous-time process.
Let (Ω,A,P) be a probability space equipped with a filtration F = (Ft)t≥0 satisfying the usual
conditions. Let W = (Wt, t ≥ 0) be a Brownian motion which is F-adapted. For a given country,
1The data for the interest rates comes from the official website of ECB and that for the other factors from the
official website of European Commission.
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Figure 3: Solvency of four countries of euro area.
we assume that the solvency is governed by a process S = (St, t ≥ 0) satisfying the following
diffusion:
dSt = St(µt dt+ σt dWt), S0 = x, (2.2)
where µ and σ are F-predictable processes such that
∫ T
0 |µt|dt+
∫ T
0 |σt|2dt <∞ for any T > 0.
Let L be a real positive constant with L < S0 which represents a threshold of the debt crisis.
More precisely, if S falls below L, we consider that the sovereign becomes insolvent. Then, we
define a random time τ0 as the first hitting time of the barrier L by the solvency process S, i.e.,
τ0 := inf{t ≥ 0 : St ≤ L}, (2.3)
with the convention inf ∅ =∞. Note that τ0 is a predictable F-stopping time.
2.2 Critical political event
Generally speaking, when a sovereign becomes fiscally vulnerable, a political meeting will be
organized at which political decisions need to be made concerning the sovereign default. The
meeting date is a critical date for the concerned sovereign and often comes shortly after the
solvency barrier hitting time τ0. In this paper, we assume that the critical date coincides with
the time τ0. We also assume that the result of political decisions depends on some exogenous
factor, such as an economic or financial shock: if the shock has occurred before the critical date,
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then the sovereign can possibly end up in default at τ0; otherwise, it receives a financial aid
package without immediate default at τ0. Indeed, the term financial aid package is perceived
as any assistance from third parties with the aim of improving the solvency of the country in
debt crisis, including a bailout loan, a quantitative easing policy, etc. From an economic point
of view, when the solvency is below the threshold, an exogenous shock can make things worse so
that the aid from third parties will be too costly (for example, austerity policies can do harms
to the economy) and the political decisions are in favor of a sovereign default.
We model the exogenous shock by the jump of a Poisson process N = (Nt, t ≥ 0) with
intensity λN > 0 which is independent of the filtration F. Suppose that the result of political
decisions depends on the value of N at the critical date τ0. More precisely, we define
ζ =
{
τ0, on {Nτ0 ≥ 1},
∞, on {Nτ0 = 0}.
(2.4)
The random time ζ takes into account both the sovereign solvency and the political decisions.
Obviously, ζ is not an F-stopping time. However, ζ is an honest time (e.g. Barlow [3]). In fact,
for any t ≥ 0, 1{ζ≤t}ζ = 1{ζ≤t}τ0 = 1{ζ≤t}(t ∧ τ0), where t ∧ τ0 is Ft-measurable.
2.3 Idiosyncratic credit risk: a Cox process model
Besides the macroeconomic and political impact, we also consider the credit risk related to the
idiosyncratic financial circumstance of the sovereign, and we adopt the widely-used Cox process
model.
Let the idiosyncratic default intensity λ = (λt, t ≥ 0) be a positive F-adapted process. In
the literature on the corporate credit risks as in [9], the default intensity can depend on the
pre-default equity price process. In our case, λ can depend on the solvency S. For example, let
λt = λ(t, St), where λ : R+ × R+ → R+ is assumed to be bounded as S → ∞, which implies
that in a healthy situation of solvency, the idiosyncratic default risk is limited.
We introduce the default hazard process Λ = (Λt, t ≥ 0) as Λt =
∫ t
0 λsds. Let η be an
A-measurable exponentially distributed random variable of unit parameter independent of both
F and the Poisson process N , and ξ be the time of default due to the idiosyncratic financial
situations, given by a Cox process model, i.e.,
ξ := inf {t ≥ 0 : Λt ≥ η} . (2.5)
As usual, the random time ξ is a totally inaccessible stopping time with respect to the progressive
enlargement of the filtration F by ξ, namely the filtration Fξ = (Fξt )t≥0, where Fξt = ∩s>t(σ({ξ ≤
u} : u ≤ s) ∨ Fs).
2.4 Sovereign default time: a hybrid model
We now model the sovereign default by combining the economic and political influences described
by ζ and the idiosyncratic credit risk described by ξ. Let the sovereign default time be
τ := ζ ∧ ξ. (2.6)
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This sovereign default model has a hybrid nature of both structural and reduced-form ap-
proaches, which means that the sovereign default can result either from macroeconomic and
political events, or from its own idiosyncratic financial situations..
We make some comparisons with the jump to default extended CEV credit risk model.
1. If (St, t ≥ 0) follows a CEV model, then the default time τ defined in (2.6) is similar to
the jump to default extended CEV model. We refer the readers to [14, 15] for background
about the CEV process and we shall discuss the CEV case in more detail in Section 3.2.2.
Note that the default time τ in our model is not bounded by its predictable component
τ0. In fact, on the set {τ0 < ξ} ∩ {Nτ0 = 0}, τ = ξ > τ0.
2. We assume some technical hypotheses as in [9] with suitable financial interpretation. Let
the idiosyncratic intensity be given in the form λt = λ(t, St). When the solvency S →∞,
the sovereign has almost no chance to default, then λ should remain bounded. When
S → 0, the solvency is in an unfavorable situation and may trigger a default, so that
the idiosyncratic default intensity can explode in this case. In general, the intensity λ is
decreasing with respect to the solvency S.
3. If the Poisson intensity of the exogenous shock λN → 0, then the default never occurs at
τ0, and our model converges to a Cox process model. On the contrary, when λ
N →∞, we
have τ = τ0 ∧ ξ. In this case, we recover the jump to default extended CEV model.
2.5 Extension to re-adjusted solvency thresholds
In practice, if the debt and deficit situation of the sovereign is excessive and has no improve-
ment, the authorities may be less confident and consequently relax the requirements on the
solvency barrier. In this case, other critical political events may be gradually anticipated. This
observation motivates us to extend the hybrid model to the case of multiple critical dates where
solvency thresholds can be re-adjusted.
Let n ∈ N, and L1, L2, . . . , Ln ∈ R+ such that S0 > L1 > L2 > . . . > Ln, representing
different levels of solvency requirements. We define a sequence of solvency barrier hitting times
{τi}ni=1 as
τi = inf{t ≥ 0 : St ≤ Li}, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (2.7)
The sequence {τi}ni=1 is increasing since the solvency requirements are decreasing. When the
solvency falls below a certain requirement Li, we assume that a critical political event is organized
immediately at τi. If an exogenous shock has already arrived before, then the sovereign can
possibly default at τi and no more critical political events will be planned; if no exogenous shock
arrives before τi, the sovereign may obtain a financial aid to avoid an immediate default, which
makes it possible to predetermine another critical political event when the solvency falls below
Li+1, and so on and so forth, until the requirements on the solvency are exhausted.
The exogenous factor is modeled by an inhomogeneous Poisson process N with intensity
function λN (t), and we define a random time ζ∗ as
ζ∗ = τi, on {Nτi−1 = 0} ∩ {Nτi ≥ 1}, i ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1} (2.8)
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with convention τ0 = 0 and τn+1 =∞. Note that for t ≥ 0, one has
1{ζ∗>t} =
n+1∑
i=1
1{τi>t}(1{Nτi−1=0} − 1{Nτi=0}) =
n+1∑
i=1
1{τi−1≤t<τi}1{Nτi−1=0}. (2.9)
We have that P(∪ni=1{ω : τi(ω) = ζ∗(ω) < ∞}) = P(ζ∗ < ∞), then ζ∗ is an accessible stopping
time (c.f. Protter [25, Chapter III.2]).
Similar to the case of single critical date, the sovereign can be caused either by the successive
downgrade of solvency or by the idiosyncratic credit risk. Then, the sovereign default time is
defined as
τ = ζ∗ ∧ ξ, (2.10)
where ξ is still given by (2.5). In this case, the default time τ is decomposed into an accessible
part, which has n predictable components, and a totally inaccessible part.
3 Probability of default on multiple critical dates
In this section, we are interested in the probability that the sovereign default occurs immediately
at political critical dates. As we show, such default probabilities are nonzero in the hybrid model,
which implies atoms in the probability law of default.
3.1 Conditional default and survival probability
We consider the sovereign default given by the hybrid model (2.10). For any i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
let the Ft-conditional probability that the sovereign default τ coincides with τi be denoted by
pit := P(τ = τi|Ft), t ≥ 0.
Proposition 3.1 The process (pit, t ≥ 0) is a stopped F-martingale at τi and is given by
pit = E
[(
e−
∫ τi−1
0 λ
N (s)ds − e−
∫ τi
0 λ
N (s)ds
)
e−Λτi |Ft
]
(3.1)
Proof: The event {τ = τi} equals {τi ≤ ξ,Nτi−1 = 0, Nτi ≥ 1}. Since τi is F-stopping time,
the Poisson process N and the random variable η are mutually independent and in addition
independent of F, one has
P(τ = τi|F∞) = P(τi ≤ ξ|F∞)P(Nτi−1 = 0, Nτi ≥ 1|F∞)
= P(Λτi ≤ η|F∞)
(
e−
∫ τi−1
0 λ
N (s)ds − e−
∫ τi
0 λ
N (s)ds
)
(3.2)
which implies (3.1) and the fact that pit is stopped at τi. 
We notice from the above proposition that on the set {τi ≤ t}, pit does not depend on t,
which means that the information concerning the impact of a political decision neutralizes after
the event. In particular, we have
P(τ = τi) = pi0 = E
[(
e−
∫ τi−1
0 λ
N (s)ds − e−
∫ τi
0 λ
N (s)ds
)
e−Λτi
]
. (3.3)
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We now compute the conditional survival probability of the sovereign and study the immer-
sion property.
Proposition 3.2 For all u, t ∈ R+, the F-conditional survival probability is given by
P(τ > u|Ft) = E
[
exp
(
−
n∑
i=1
1{τi≤u}
∫ τi
τi−1
λN (s)ds− Λu
)∣∣Ft] (3.4)
Proof: For all u, t ∈ R+, by (2.9), one has
P(τ > u|Ft) = P(ζ∗ > u, ξ > u|Ft)
= E
[( n+1∑
i=1
1{τi−1≤u<τi}1{Nτi−1=0}
)
1{ξ>u}
∣∣∣Ft].
If u ≤ t, then
P(τ > u|Ft) =
n+1∑
i=1
1{τi−1≤u<τi}E
[
1{Nτi−1=0}1{ξ>u}
∣∣Ft]
=
n+1∑
i=1
1{τi−1≤u<τi}E
[
1{Nτi−1=0}1{η>Λu}
∣∣Ft]
=
( n+1∑
i=1
1{τi−1≤u<τi}e
− ∫ τi−10 λN (s)ds)e−Λu .
= exp
(
−
n+1∑
i=1
1{τi−1≤u<τi}
∫ τi−1
0
λN (s)ds
)
e−Λu
= exp
(
−
n∑
i=1
1{τi≤u}
∫ τi
τi−1
λN (s)ds− Λu
)
.
If u > t, we calculate P(τ > u|Ft) as the Ft-conditional expectation of P(τ > u|Fu), which
implies (3.4). 
Let the global information structure be given as usual by the progressive enlargement of the
filtration F by the sovereign default time τ , that is,
Gt =
⋂
s>t
(
σ({τ ≤ u} : u ≤ s) ∨ Fs
)
, t ≥ 0.
Then the couple (F,G) satisfies the immersion property or the so-called (H)-hypothesis, that
is, any F-martingale remains a G-martingale. Indeed, by Proposition 3.2, when u ≤ t, the
F-conditional probability does not depend on t, i.e.,
P(τ > u|Ft) = P(τ > u|Fu), u ≤ t.
This last equality is equivalent to the (H)-hypothesis (see Elliott, Jeanblanc and Yor [18]). The
following result is a direct consequence of [18, Lemma 3.1] and Proposition 3.2.
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Corollary 3.3 For all t, T ∈ R+ such that t ≤ T , the G-conditional survival probability is
given by
P(τ > T |Gt) = 1{τ>t}E
[
exp
(
−
n∑
i=1
1{t<τi≤T}
∫ τi
τi−1
λN (s)ds−
∫ T
t
λs ds
)∣∣Ft]. (3.5)
3.2 Default probability in a Markovian setting
The general form of the sovereign default probability at critical dates pit is given by Proposition
3.1. We now consider several specific settings when the solvency process is a geometric Brownian
motion or a CEV process.
We first make some simplified assumptions. We suppose that the equation (2.2) is homoge-
neous and that the solvency process is given by
dSt = St
(
µ(St)dt+ σ(St)
)
dWt, S0 = x
where µ(·) : R+ → R and σ(·) : R+ → R+ satisfy regular enough conditions for existence and
uniqueness of a strong solution {Sxt , t ≥ 0} (see e.g. Revuz and Yor [26, Theorem 3.5] for
details). Let L denote the generator of S, i.e., for any function f ∈ C2 : R+ → R,
Lf(z) = zµ(z)f ′(z) + z
2
2
σ2(z)f ′′(z).
Suppose in addition that the intensity of the exogenous shock is constant, so in the inhomoge-
neous Poisson process, the intensity function is λN (t) = λN > 0 for any t ≥ 0. Furthermore, we
specify the idiosyncratic default intensity process λ = (λt, t ≥ 0) as a decreasing function of the
solvency, i.e., λt = λ(St) with λ(·) : R+ → R+ being decreasing.
We consider the Laplace transform for the F-stopping time
ρx = inf{t ≥ 0 : Sxt ≤ L} with Sx0 = x.
For any k ≥ 0, let
Q(x; k, L) := E
[
exp
(
− kρx −
∫ ρx
0
λ(Sxs ) ds
)]
(3.6)
One can prove that (3.6) is the representation of the solution to the following Dirichlet problem
Lu(z)− (λ(z) + k)u(z) = 0 on {z > L}
u(L) = 1.
(3.7)
Indeed, since ρx is a predictable stopping time, there exists an increasing sequence of stopping
times (ρm)m≥1 such that ρm < ρx and limm→∞ ρm = ρx, P-a.s.. Let βxt = exp(−
∫ t
0 (k+λ(S
x
s ))ds)
for any t ≥ 0. Then on the set {t < ρx}, one has
d(βxt u(S
x
t )) = β
x
t u
′(Sxt )σ(S
x
t )S
x
t dWt
where u is a solution to the Dirichlet problem (3.7). We then have
E[βxρmu(S
x
ρm)]− u(x) = E
[∫ ρm
0
βxs u
′(Sxs )σ(S
x
s )S
x
s dWs
]
,
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where the right-hand side vanishes thanks to the boundedness of β and the smoothness of u.
Thus, when m tends to infinity, u(x) = E[βxρxu(L)] = E[exp(−
∫ ρx
0 (λ(S
x
s ) + k)ds)]. We refer the
reader to Karatzas and Shreve [23, Chapter 5, Proposition 7.2] and Touzi [27, Theorem 2.8] for
a general representation of this kind of Dirichlet problem.
Proposition 3.4 The F-martingale (pit, t ≥ 0), i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, is computed as
pit = e
− ∫ t∧τi0 λ(Su)duQ(St∧τi−1 ;λN , Li−1)
·
[
e−λ
N (t∧τi−1)Q(S(t∧τi)∨τi−1 ; 0, Li)− e−λ
N (t∧τi)Q(S(t∧τi)∨τi−1 ;λ
N , Li)
]
, t ≥ 0,
with L0 = S0 = x.
Proof: By Proposition 3.1 and the section assumptions, we have for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and
t ≥ 0 that
pit = E
[
(e−λ
N τi−1 − e−λN τi)e−
∫ τi
0 λ(Su)du
∣∣Ft] .
Since pi is a stopped martingale on τi, it suffices to compute p
i
t for t ≤ τi. On the set {τi−1 ≤
t < τi}, by the Markovian property of the process S, we obtain
pit = e
−λN τi−1E
[
e−
∫ τi
0 λ(Su)du
∣∣Ft]− E [e−λN τi−∫ τi0 λ(Su)du∣∣Ft]
= e−
∫ t
0 λ(Su)du
[
e−λ
N τi−1Q(St; 0, Li)− e−λN tQ(St;λN , Li)
]
.
In particular, one has
piτi−1 = e
−λN τi−1−
∫ τi−1
0 λ(Su)du
[
Q(Li−1; 0, Li)−Q(Li−1;λN , Li)
]
,
which yields that on the set {t < τi−1},
pit = e
−λN t−∫ t0 λ(Su)duQ(St;λN , Li−1) [Q(Li−1; 0, Li)−Q(Li−1;λN , Li)] .
Finally, we note that Q(Sτi−1 ; k, Li−1) = Q(Li−1; k, Li−1) = 1 for any k, which implies (3.8). 
The above proposition shows that it is essential to calculate the quantity Q(x; k, L) to obtain
explicit form of the atom probability. We present below two cases.
3.2.1 Case of geometric Brownian motion
Let the solvency process S be a geometric Brownian motion which is the solution to dSt =
St(µdt + σdWt), t ≥ 0, where W is a standard Brownian motion, µ, σ ∈ R with σ > 0 and
S0 = x. Similar as in [9], we suppose that the idiosyncratic default intensity λ is a decreasing
function of the solvency S as
λt = λ(St) =
a
S2βt
+ b (3.8)
where a > 0, b, β ≥ 0 represent respectively the scale parameter governing the sensitivity of λ
to S, the constant lower bound and the elasticity parameter. Then, by (3.7), u(x) = Q(x; k, L)
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is the solution to the following Sturm-Liouville equation (see Everitt [19]):
1
2
σ2x2u′′(x) + µxu′(x)− (ax−2β + b+ k)u(x) = 0 on (L,+∞);
u(L) = 1.
(3.9)
If β = 0, let kˆ = a + b + k. Apart from solving the equation (3.9), one can compute directly
E[e−kˆρx ] by noticing that (exp(−
√
2kˆWt−kˆt), t ≥ 0) is a martingale. Then the optional sampling
theorem yields (see Borodin and Salminen [6, Part II, Chapter 9, 2.0.1])
Q(x; k, L) =
(
L
x
)√ν2+2kˆ/σ2+ν
where ν = µ/σ2 − 1/2.
If β > 0, we let w(z) = Cu(z
− 1
β )z
− ν
β , where C = w(L−β)L−ν . Then, w satisfies the following
Bessel equation in a modified form ([19, Chapter 17]):
(zw′(z))′ − 1
β2
(
ν2 + 2(k + b)/σ2
)
z−1w′(z) =
2az
β2σ2
w(z). (3.10)
Let ψ = 1β
√
ν2 + 2(k + b)/σ2, then the above equation admits two basic solutions Iψ(z
√
2a/σβ)
and Kψ(z
√
2a/σβ), where I and K are modified Bessel functions with the following properties
([6, Appendix 2.4]):
(z−ψIψ(z))′ = z−ψIψ+1(z), (z−ψKψ(z))′ = −z−ψKψ+1(z),
which implies that z−ψIψ(z
√
2a/σβ) is increasing and z−ψKψ(z
√
2a/σβ) is decreasing. More-
over, one has u(z
− 1
β ) = (z−ψw(z))zψ−
ν
β . We have, by [24, Theorem 3.1] that (see also [6, Part
II, Chapter 9, 2.8.3])
Q(x; k, L) =
x−νw(x−β)
L−νw(L−β)
=
(
L
x
)ν Iψ(√2a/σβxβ)
Iψ(
√
2a/σβLβ)
where I is modified Bessel function of the first kind, defined as
Iψ(x) :=
∞∑
i=0
(x/2)ψ+2i
i!Γ(ψ + i+ 1)
with Γ being the gamma function.
3.2.2 Case of the CEV process
We now consider the case where the volatility is a monotonic function of the solvency. On the
one hand, when the solvency decreases, lower solvency (higher deficit) indicates higher level
of government borrowing, leading to lower growth rate, as well as smaller future expenditure
to improve the budgetary situation. All these add more uncertainty to the solvency. On the
other hand, when the solvency increases, besides higher growth rate, higher solvency (surplus)
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may imply higher fiscal revenue, which the government is under pressure to disburse for social
welfare, also making the solvency become more uncertain. In other words, the volatility has the
possibility to be either an increasing or a decreasing function of the solvency. Let the solvency
process be a CEV process driven by the following diffusion:
dSt = µSt dt+ δS
β+1
t dWt, S0 = x, (3.11)
where β ∈ R and δ > 0 are respectively the elasticity parameter and the scale parameter of the
volatility. For β > 0 (respectively β < 0), the volatility σ(S) = δSβ is an increasing (respectively
a decreasing) function of S. In particular, the process S is a geometric Brownian motion in the
case β = 0.
The specification of the idiosyncratic default intensity λ(S) depends on the sign of the
parameter β. More precisely, when β > 0 (respectively β < 0), λ(S) is an affine function of
1
σ2(S)
(respectively σ2(S)), i.e.,
λ(S) =
a
S2|β|
+ b, a > 0, b ≥ 0, β ∈ R. (3.12)
Then, u(x) = Q(x; k, L) is the decreasing solution of the following equation:
1
2
δ2x2+2βu′′ + µxu′ − (ax−2|β| + b+ k)u = 0, on (L,+∞);
u(L) = 1.
(3.13)
The fundamental solutions to this last equation are different according to the sign of β.
In literature, another similar equation, called CEV ordinary differential equation (ODE),
has been studied by Davydov and Linetsky in [14] for the valuation of path-dependent options,
where the coefficient of u is a negative constant. We make use of the knowledge of the solutions
to the CEV ODE to solve the equation (3.13). In the following, we consider separately the cases
β > 0 and β < 0.
Case β > 0: We let v(x) = C1u(x)e
κx−2β , where κ = 1
2βδ2
(
√
µ2 + 2aδ2 − µ) > 0 and C1 =
v(L)e−κ/L2β . Then, v satisfies the following CEV ODE:
1
2
δ2x2+2βv′′ +
√
µ2 + 2aδ2xv′ − (κβ(2β + 1)δ2 + b+ k) v = 0. (3.14)
The above equation admits an increasing fundamental solution (which we reject since u is de-
creasing) and a decreasing fundamental solution ([14, Proposition 5]) given by:
v(x) = xβ+
1
2 e
√
µ2+2aδ2
2βδ2
x−2β
Mn,m
(√
µ2 + 2aδ2
βδ2
x−2β
)
,
where n = 12 +
1
4β− κβ(2β+1)δ
2+b+k
2β
√
µ2+2aσ2
= µ(2β+1)+2b+2k
4β
√
µ2+2aδ2
, m = 14β and Mn,m(z) := z
m+1/2e−z/2F1(m−
n+ 1/2, 2m+ 1, z) is Whittaker function of the first kind with
F1(a, b, z) := 1 +
∞∑
j=1
a(a+ 1) . . . (a+ j − 1)zj
b(b+ 1) . . . (b+ j − 1)j!
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being Kummer confluent hypergeometric function of the first kind. This fundamental solution
implies that
Q(x; k, L) =
v(x)e−κ/x2β
C1
=
xβ+
1
2 e
µ
2βδ2
x−2β
Mn,m
(√
µ2+2aδ2
βδ2
x−2β
)
Lβ+
1
2 e
µ
2βδ2
L−2β
Mn,m
(√
µ2+2aδ2
βδ2
L−2β
) ,
which is valid for any µ ∈ R.
Case β < 0: We let y(z) = C2u(z
1
γ )z
1
2
− 1
2γ , where
γ =
{√
1 + 8a/δ2, µ > 0,
−√1 + 8a/δ2, µ ≤ 0,
and C2 = y(L
γ)L
1
2
− γ
2 . If γ < −1, y is an increasing function; if γ > 1, y should be decreasing
such that u is decreasing for all µ ∈ R, δ, a > 0, b, k ≥ 0, β < 0. Then, y satisfies another CEV
ODE as follows:
1
2
δ2γ2z2+2βˆy′′ + µγzy′ −
(
b+ k +
µγ − µ
2
)
y = 0, (3.15)
where βˆ = βγ , the sign of which depends on the sign of µ, and we note that b+ k+
µγ−µ
2 > 0 for
any µ ∈ R.
If µ > 0 (respectively µ < 0), one has γ > 1 and βˆ < 0 (respectively γ < −1 and βˆ > 0), and
we keep the decreasing (respectively increasing) fundamental solution of the equation (3.15).
Then, by [14, Proposition 5],
y(z) = z
β
γ
+ 1
2 e
µ
2βδ2
z−2β/γ
Wn′,m′
(
− |µ|
βδ2
z−2β/γ
)
,
where n′ = sgn(µβ)(12 +
γ
4β ) − 2b+2k+µγ−µ4|µβ| = 2b+2k−µ(2β+1)4|µ|β , m′ = − |γ|4β = −
√
1+8a/δ2
4β and the
function Wn,m(x) := x
m+1/2e−x/2F2(m−n+ 1/2, 2m+ 1, x) is Whittaker function of the second
kind with
F2(a, b, x) :=
Γ(1− b)
Γ(1 + a− b)F1(a, b, x) +
Γ(b− 1)
Γ(a)
x1−bF1(1 + a− b, 2− b, x)
being Kummer confluent hypergeometric function of the second kind.
If µ = 0, then γ < −1 and βˆ > 0. The increasing fundamental solution to the equation
(3.15) is
y(z) =
√
zK2m′
(
−z
−β/γ
δβ
√
2b+ 2k + µγ − µ
)
,
where Kψ(x) is modified Bessel function of the second kind, defined as
Kψ(x) :=
pi
2 sin(ψpi)
(I−ψ(x)− Iψ(x)) .
15
Thus, the fundamental solution y implies that
Q(x; k, L) =
y(xγ)x
1
2
− γ
2
C2
=

xβ+
1
2 e
µ
2βδ2
x−2β
Wn′,m′
(
− |µ|
βδ2
x−2β
)
Lβ+
1
2 e
µ
2βδ2
L−2β
Wn′,m′
(
− |µ|
βδ2
L−2β
) , µ 6= 0,
√
xK2m′
(
−x−β
δβ
√
2b+2k+µγ−µ
)
√
LK2m′
(
−L−β
δβ
√
2b+2k+µγ−µ
) , µ = 0.
4 Generalized density framework
In this section, we present a general setting for the sovereign default model we consider. In the
literature, the default density approach has been proposed by El Karoui, Jeanblanc and Jiao
[17] to study the impact of default events. The key hypothesis is the existence of the conditional
density with respect to the reference filtration F so that the default time is totally inaccessible
G-stopping time. We extend this approach to more general random times which have both
predictable and totally inaccessible parts.
4.1 Generalized density hypothesis
We first introduce the following assumption, called the generalized density hypothesis, which
implies that when avoiding a family of F-stopping times, the random time τ admits a conditional
density w.r.t. F.
Assumption 4.1 We assume that there exists a finite family of F-stopping times (τi)ni=1 satis-
fying P(τi = τj) = 0 for all i 6= j, (i, j = 1, · · · , n), together with a family of F⊗B(R+)-adapted
processes α(·) such that
E
[
h(τ)
n∏
i=1
1{τ 6=τi}
∣∣∣∣Ft] = ∫
R+
h(u)αt(u)du P-a.s.
for any bounded Borel function h. We call α(·) the generalized F-density of τ .
In the sovereign default model (2.10), (τi)
n
i=1 correspond to the successive political critical dates
which are predictable F-stopping times. In the general case, they can be F-stopping times with
both accessible and inaccessible parts. Without loss of generality, (τi)
n
i=1 can be chosen to be a
family of strictly increasing F-stopping times.
There exists a martingale version of the generalized density such that α(θ) is a ca`dla`g F-
martingale for any θ ∈ R+ (see [22, Proposition 2.3] for details). For each i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, denote
by pi = (pit, t ≥ 0) a ca`dla`g version of the F-martingale where pit = P(τ = τi|Ft). Assumption
4.1 implies that, for any t ≥ 0,∫
R+
αt(u)du+
n∑
i=1
pit = 1 P-a.s..
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Moreover, for any bounded Borel function h, one has
E[h(τ)|Ft] =
∫
R+
h(u)αt(u)du+
n∑
i=1
E[h(τi)piτi∨t|Ft]. (4.1)
Then the Aze´ma supermatingale of the random time τ is given by
Gt := P(τ > t|Ft) =
∫ ∞
t
αt(u)du+
n∑
i=1
1{τi>t}p
i
t. (4.2)
4.2 Sovereign default model revisited
The generalized density approach provides a general setting for hybrid default models. In the
credit risk literature, the hybrid models such as the generalized Cox process model in [4], the
jump to default CEV models in [9] and [8] as well as the credit migration model in [10] satisfy
the generalized density hypothesis. In particular, the sovereign default model that we have
developed in the previous section is also such a case which we revisit below.
Proposition 4.2 The random time τ defined in (2.10) satisfies Assumption 4.1, and the gen-
eralized F-density α(·) is given for all u, t ∈ R+, on the set ∩ni=1{τi 6= u}, by
αt(u) = E
[
λu exp
(
−
∫ u
0
λs ds−
n∑
i=1
1{τi<u}
∫ τi
τi−1
λN (s)ds
)∣∣Ft] (4.3)
Proof: For any w ≤ t, denote Jt(w) := P(τ ≤ w|Ft) =
∫ w
0 αt(u)du+
∑n
i=1 1{τi≤w}p
i
t where we
recall that pit = P(τ = τi|Ft), i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, are given by Proposition 3.1 as
pit =
(
e−
∫ τi−1
0 λ
N (s)ds − e−
∫ τi
0 λ
N (s)ds
)
e−
∫ τi
0 λs ds, on {τi ≤ t}, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Indeed, for any w ≤ t,
Jt(w) =
∫ w
0
λue
− ∫ u0 λs ds−∑ni=1 1{τi<u} ∫ τiτi−1 λN (s)dsdu+ n∑
i=1
1{τi≤w}p
i
t
= −
∫ w
0
e
−∑ni=1 1{τi<u} ∫ τiτi−1 λN (s)dsd(e− ∫ u0 λs ds) + n∑
i=1
1{τi≤w}p
i
t
= −
∫ w
0
( n+1∑
i=1
1{τi−1<u≤τi}e
− ∫ τi−10 λN (s)ds)d(e− ∫ u0 λs ds) + n∑
i=1
1{τi≤w}p
i
t
= −
n+1∑
i=1
e−
∫ τi−1
0 λ
N (s)ds
∫ w
0
1{τi−1<u≤τi}d(e
− ∫ u0 λs ds) + n∑
i=1
1{τi≤w}p
i
t
= −
n+1∑
i=1
1{τi−1≤w}e
− ∫ τi−10 λN (s)ds (e− ∫ w∧τi0 λs ds − e− ∫ τi−10 λs ds)+ n∑
i=1
1{τi≤w}p
i
t
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By rewriting explicitly pit, one has
Jt(w) = 1−
n+1∑
i=1
1{τi−1≤w}e
− ∫ τi−10 λN (s)ds−∫ w∧τi0 λs ds + n∑
i=1
1{τi≤w}e
− ∫ τi−10 λN (s)ds−∫ τi0 λs ds
= 1−
n+1∑
i=1
1{τi−1≤w<τi}e
− ∫ w0 λs ds−∫ τi−10 λN (s)ds
= 1− e−
∫ w
0 λs ds−
∑n
i=1 1{τi≤w}
∫ τi
τi−1 λ
N (s)ds
= 1− P(τ > w|Ft) = P(τ ≤ w|Ft).
When u > t, we have αt(u) = E[αu(u)|Ft] by martingale property, which finishes the proof. 
Remark 4.3 We note that in the sovereign default model (2.10), the following equalities are
satisfied: αt(u) = αu(u) for 0 ≤ u ≤ t on
⋂n
i=1{τi 6= u} (see the proposition above) and pit = piτi∧t
for any i ∈ {1, · · · , n} (see Proposition 3.1). In the generalized density framework, these two
equalities imply P(τ > u|Ft) = P(τ > u|Fu), for u ≤ t and hence the immersion property holds
(c.f. [22, Proposition 5.1]), as already mentioned previously.
4.3 Compensator process
The compensator and the intensity processes of default play an important role in the reduced-
form approach of credit risk modelling. Under the generalized density hypothesis, we show that
the compensator process of τ is in general discontinuous and the intensity does not necessarily
exist.
Recall that an increasing ca`dla`g F-predictable process ΛF is called F-compensator process
of a random time τ if the process (1{τ≤t} − ΛFt∧τ , t ≥ 0) is a G-martingale. The process ΛG =
(ΛFt∧τ , t ≥ 0) is called G-compensator of τ . The general method for computing the compensator
is given in Jeulin and Yor [21, Proposition 2] and [18] by using the Doob-Meyer decomposition
of the Aze´ma supermartingale G.
When the immersion property holds, G is the unique solution of the following stochastic
differential equation:
dGt = −Gt−dΛFt , t > 0, G0 = 0.
Then one has G = E(−ΛF) where E denotes the Dole´an-Dade exponential. Under the generalized
density hypothesis, in terms of α(·) and (pi)ni=1, the F-compensator process ΛF of τ is then given
as
ΛFt =
∫ t
0
αs(s)ds
Gs−
+
n∑
i=1
1{τi≤t}
piτi
Gτ−i
, t ∈ R+. (4.4)
In the sovereign default model (2.10), the Aze´ma supermartingale (4.2) has an explicit form
given by Proposition 3.2 as
Gt = P(τ > t|Ft) = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
λs ds−
n∑
i=1
1{τi≤t}
∫ τi
τi−1
λN (s)ds
)
, t ∈ R+, (4.5)
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which is a decreasing process due to the immersion property. By consequence, we obtain
ΛFt =
∫ t
0
λs ds+
n∑
i=1
1{τi≤t}
(
1− e−
∫ τi
τi−1 λ
N (s)ds
)
, t ∈ R+. (4.6)
We underline that the intensity of sovereign default does not exist because of the discontinuity
of the compensator process at the F-stopping times (τi)ni=1. In literature, Gehmlich and Schmidt
[20] provide a class of models where the Aze´ma supermartingale contains jumps and propose a
generalization of this class with an additional stochastic integral containing atoms at predictable
stopping times.
We can also compute the hazard process Γ ([5, Chapter 5]) of the sovereign default τ as
Γt = − lnGt =
∫ t
0
λs ds+
n∑
i=1
1{τi≤t}
∫ τi
τi−1
λN (s)ds, t ∈ R+, (4.7)
Thus, the processes ΛF and Γ have the following relationship
ΛFt = Γ
c
t +
∑
0<s≤t
(
1− e−∆Γs) , t ∈ R+,
where Γc is the continuous part of Γ and ∆Γt = Γt − Γt− . We observe that the absolutely
continuous part of ΛF and Γ are identical and depends on the idiosyncratic default intensity λ.
Their jump parts depend on the solvency (through the political critical dates) and the exogenous
shock.
Remark 4.4 It is known that if the compensator process is continuous, then the hazard process
is also continuous and coincides with the compensator ([5, Proposition 6.2.2]). In the sovereign
default model above, we provide a counterexample where the hazard process does not equal to
the compensator.
5 Applications to sovereign defaultable claims
In this section, we apply the sovereign default model to financial assets which are subject to
sovereign risk such as the government bonds. We are particularly interested in the behavior of
long term bond yield during the sovereign crisis and we show that the hybrid model provides an
explanation to the jump behaviors of the bond yield around critical dates.
5.1 Sovereign bond and credit spread
We consider a defaultable sovereign zero-coupon bond of maturity T . The recovery payment
at default is represented by an F-predictable process R valued in [0, 1) if the sovereign default
τ occurs prior to the maturity. In a financial market with credit risk, when the immersion
property holds, the risk neutral probability in F is also a risk neutral probability in G (c.f.
Coculescu, Jeanblanc and Nikeghbali [13]). Let Q be a risk-neutral probability and assume that
all the dynamics of the sovereign default model are given under Q. The generalized density
hypothesis remains valid under an equivalent probability change. We denote by r = (rt, t ≥ 0)
the default-free interest rate process and by D(t, T ) the value at t < T of the zero-coupon bond.
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Proposition 5.1 The value of the defaultable zero-coupon bond is given by
D(t, T ) = D0(t, T ) +D1(t, T ), (5.1)
where D0 is the pre-default price related to the payment at maturity, computed as
D0(t, T ) = 1{τ>t}EQ
[
exp
(− ∫ T
t
(rs + λs)ds−
n∑
i=1
1{t<τi≤T}
∫ τi
τi−1
λN (s)ds
)∣∣Ft], (5.2)
and D1 is related to the recovery payment, given by
D1(t, T ) =
1{τ>t}
Gt
EQ
[ ∫ T
t
e−
∫ u
t rs dsRuαu(u)du+
n∑
i=1
1{t<τi≤T}e
− ∫ τit rs dsRτipiτi∣∣Ft], (5.3)
where Gt = Q(τ > t|Ft).
Proof: The pre-default value of the bond is given by
D(t, T ) = EQ
[
e−
∫ T
t rs ds1{τ>T}|Gt
]
+ EQ
[
e
∫ τ
t rs ds1{t<τ≤T}Rτ |Gt
]
=: D0(t, T ) +D1(t, T ).
The first term D0(t, T ) is obtained by
D0(t, T ) = 1{τ>t}EQ
[GT
Gt
e−
∫ T
t rs ds|Ft
]
together with (4.5), and the second term results from [5, Proposition 5.1.1] as
D1(t, T ) =
1{τ>t}
Gt
EQ
[
EQ
[
1{t<τ≤T} exp(−
∫ τ
t
rs ds)Rτ |FT
]∣∣Ft]
=
1{τ>t}
Gt
EQ
[ ∫ T
t
e−
∫ u
t rs dsRuαT (u)du+
n∑
i=1
1{t<τi≤T}e
− ∫ τit rs dsRτipiT
∣∣∣Ft].
We complete the proof by using the equality (4.5) and the following properties: αT (u) = αu(u)
for t ≤ u ≤ T on ⋂ni=1{τi 6= u} and piT = piτi on {t < τi ≤ T} for any i ∈ {1, · · · , n} (see Remark
4.3). 
We are interested in the bond prices at the political critical dates (τi)
n
i=1 and in particular
the jump behavior. Let
∆D(t, T ) := D(t, T )−D(t−, T ), t ≤ T
which is the sum of ∆D0(t, T ) and ∆D1(t, T ) that we compute respectively. We assume that
the filtration F only supports continuous martingales. On the one hand,
D0(t, T ) = 1{τ>t}EQ
[
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
(rs + λs) ds−
n∑
i=1
1{τi≤T}
∫ τi
τi−1
λN (s) ds
∣∣∣Ft]
· exp
(∫ t
0
(rs + λs) ds+
n∑
i=1
1{τi≤t}
∫ τi
τi−1
λN (s) ds
)
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which implies
∆D0(t, T ) = D0(t, T )
n∑
i=1
1{τi=t}
(
1− e−
∫ τi
τi−1 λ
N (s) ds
)
, on {τ > t}. (5.4)
On the other hand, by (5.3),
∆D1(t, T ) = ∆(G−1t )EQ
[ ∫ T
t
e−
∫ u
t rsdsRuαT (u)du+
n∑
i=1
1{t<τi≤T}e
− ∫ τit rs dsRτipiτi
∣∣∣Ft]
− 1
Gt−
n∑
i=1
1{τi=t}Rτip
i
τi , on {τ > t}.
Moreover, by (4.5) one has
∆(G−1t ) =
1
Gt
n∑
i=1
1{τi=t}
(
1− e−
∫ τi
τi−1 λ
N (s) ds
)
.
We then deduce
∆D1(t, T ) = D1(t, T )
n∑
i=1
1{τi=t}
(
1− e−
∫ τi
τi−1 λ
N (s) ds
)
− 1
Gt−
n∑
i=1
1{τi=t}Rτip
i
τi on {τ > t},
(5.5)
which implies, combining (5.4) and (5.5), that
∆D(t, T ) =
n∑
i=1
1{τi=t}D(τi, T )
(
1− e−
∫ τi
τi−1 λ
N (s) ds
)
−
n∑
i=1
1{τi=t}
1
Gτ−i
Rτip
i
τi on {τ > t}.
By using the relation
piτi
Gτi−
= 1− e−
∫ τi
τi−1 λ
N (s) ds
,
we obtain finally
∆D(t, T ) =
n∑
i=1
1{τi=t}
(
D(τi, T )−Rτi
)(
1− e−
∫ τi
τi−1 λ
N (s) ds
)
, (5.6)
and in particular,
∆D(τi, T ) =
(
D(τi, T )−Rτi
)(
1− e−
∫ τi
τi−1 λ
N (s) ds
)
on {τi ≤ T}. (5.7)
Let the pre-default yield to maturity of the defaultable bond on {t < τ} be
Y d(t, T ) = − lnD(t, T )
T − t . (5.8)
Similarly, the yield to maturity of a classical default-free zero coupon bond is given as
Y (t, T ) = − lnB(t, T )
T − t .
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where B(t, T ) = EQ[e−
∫ T
t rs ds|Ft] denotes the price at t ≤ T of the default-free zero coupon
bond of maturity T . Let the pre-default credit spread, noted S(t, T ), be defined as the difference
between the two yields to maturity, i.e.,
S(t, T ) := Y d(t, T )− Y (t, T ) = − 1
T − t ln
D(t, T )
B(t, T )
.
Then,
∆S(t, T ) = S(t, T )− S(t−, T ) = −∆ lnD(t, T )
T − t = −
1
T − t ln
(
1 +
∆D(t, T )
D(t−, T )
)
. (5.9)
which implies by (5.7) that the jump of the bond yield at a critical date τi is negative if and
only if ∆D(τi, T ) is positive. More precisely, ∆S(τi, T ) < 0 on {τi < T ∧ τ} if and only if
D(τi, T ) > Rτi a.s.. (5.10)
In particular, if R ≡ 0, one has D1 = 0 and ∆ lnD0(t, T ) = ∑ni=1 1{τi=t} ∫ τiτi−1 λN (s)ds. Then,
we can compute the jump in the credit spread at τi as
∆S(τi, T ) = −1{τi<T}
∆ lnD0(τi, T )
T − τi = −1{τi<T}
∫ τi
τi−1 λ
N (s)ds
T − τi . (5.11)
We notice that whether the jump of sovereign bond yield at a critical date τi is negative or
not depends on the intensity of the exogenous shock, the elapsed time between τi−1 and τi (the
solvency indirectly), and the value of the recovery payment at τi. When the recovery payment
is small enough, the condition in (5.10) can be satisfied. Moreover, if no recovery payment is
made, the size of the jumps only depends on the solvency and the exogenous shock.
5.2 Numerical illustrations
We now present numerical examples to illustrate the results obtained previously concerning the
sovereign default probability and the defaultable bond yield.
In the first example, we are interested in the default probability pi0 on a political critical
date τi, (i = 1, 2, 3), given by (3.3). We assume that the solvency process S is modelled by a
geometric Brownian motion as in Section 3.2.1, and we use the solvency data of Greece during
the period from 2003 to 2013 to estimate the parameters and obtain S0 = 1.01, µ = −0.01 and
σ = 0.14. Let the idiosyncratic default intensity process λ be specified by λ(S) = a
S2β
+ b as
in (3.8) and the Poisson intensity be a constant λN . The solvency barrier is re-adjustable with
three values L1 = 0.9, L2 = 0.8 and L3 = 0.7. Figure 4 and Figure 5 plots the probability
that the sovereign default occurs on τ1 and respectively on τ2 and τ3 as functions of the Poisson
intensity λN for different parameters a, b and β, and we show in particular the impact of the
exogenous shock intensity λN . We observe that the probability of default on τ1 is an increasing
function of λN since it is more probable for the exogenous shock to occur when λN is larger, in
which case the sovereign has higher possibility to default at the first critical date τ1 due to an
unfavorable political decision. However, when λN is large, the probability of default on other
critical dates τ2 and τ3 after τ1 is reduced because the exogenous shock has more chance to
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occur before τ1. As a result, the probabilities of default on τ2 and τ3 are increasing functions
of λN for small λN and decreasing for large λN . For comparison concerning the parameters of
the idiosyncratic intensity process, we set the parameters a = 0.05, b = 0.01 and β = 1 and
examine the impact of each parameter by considering also values a = 0.25, b = 0.05 and β = 4
respectively. Other things being equal, the probabilities of default on τ1, τ2 and τ3 are smaller
for bigger a (respectively bigger b) because the sovereign is more probable to default due to the
idiosyncratic credit risk when λ(S) is bigger. The impact of the elasticity parameter β depends
on the level of solvency, more precisely, λ(S) is decreasing (respectively increasing) when S ≥ 1
(respectively S < 1). Consequently, the probability of default on τ1 (respectively τ2, τ3) is
smaller for smaller β (respectively bigger β).
Figure 4: Probability of sovereign default on τ1
In the second example, we consider the sovereign default probability P(τ ≤ T ), which can be
computed by Proposition 3.2. The solvency process S is given as a geometric Brownian motion
with the same parameters as in the previous example. We fix the values of a = 0.05, b = 0.01
and β = 1 for idiosyncratic default intensity. Figure 6 plots the probability of default from
1 to 30 years for different values of the Poisson intensity: λN = 0 (the Cox process model),
λN = 0.05 and 0.2 respectively. We note that unsurprisingly, an exogenous shock with larger
intensity value increases the sovereign default probability.
In the third example, we illustrate the bond yield and its jump at a critical date for a
sovereign defaultable bond. The solvency is described by a CEV process as in (3.11) and we
set the parameters to be S0 = 1.01, µ = −0.01, δ = 0.03 and β = 1. The idiosyncratic default
intensity process λ is specified by λ(S) = a
S2|β| + b as in (3.12) with coefficients a = 0.005 and
b = 0.01. We assume that there is only one critical date with the solvency barrier L = 0.9
and that the risk-free interest rate is 0. Figure 7 plots the time-varying bond yield (5.8) of
a defaultable zero-coupon bond of maturity 5 years without recovery payment, as well as the
corresponding simulation scenario of the solvency process. We present two different exogenous
shock intensities: λN = 0.05 and λN = 0.2. We observe in this example that when the solvency
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Figure 5: Probability of sovereign default on τ2 and τ3 respectively.
Figure 6: Sovereign default probability.
hits the threshold 0.9, the bond yield has a negative jump, the size of which depends on the
value of λN . More precisely, a larger value of the exogenous shock intensity λN results in a
larger jump in the bond yield.
In the last example, we consider the long term Greece government bond yield of maturity
10 years. The solvency of Greece is described by a CEV process. We estimate the parameters
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Figure 7: Jump at a critical date in the sovereign defaultable bond yield (with the corresponding solvency
sample path): λN = 0.05 and 0.2 respectively.
by using the solvency data as in Figure 3 where δ and β are jointly calibrated (c.f. Chesney,
Elliott, Madan and Yang [11] and Yuen, Yang and Chu [28]) and obtain S0 = 1.01, µ = −0.01,
δ = 0.03 and β = −4.92. The coefficients of the idiosyncratic default intensity (as in (3.12))
are a = 0.013 and b = 0.035, estimated from the 3-month Greek bond yield. The solvency
barrier is re-adjustable with three values L1 = 0.9, L2 = 0.8 and L3 = 0.7. We suppose that the
intensity of the inhomogeneous Poisson process for the exogenous shock is a piecewise constant
function which change its value at each critical date. By Figure 2, given the sizes of the three
jumps, we let λN (t) = 0.07 for t ∈ [0, τ1], λN (t) = 0.16 for t ∈ (τ1, τ2] and λN (t) = 3.15 for
t ∈ (τ2, τ3], which are computed using (5.11). Figure 8 plots the time-varying bond yield of a
10-year Greek government zero-coupon bond, as well as a sample path of the solvency of Greece
which corresponds to the period of 2003-2013. We observe that the solvency of Greece tends
to fall gradually through time and hits the three thresholds successively. The bond yield has
three negative jumps at the barrier hitting times: in particular, there is a large negative jump
when the solvency falls below 0.7 since the exogenous shock intensity is at a high level, while the
first two values of exogenous intensity are relatively small. This looks like the full view of the
historical data in Figure 2 where the three jumps correspond respectively to the critical dates
in Figure 1.
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